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EXDIS

FOL TEL SENT ACTION ADDIS ABABA MOGADISCIO KHARTOUM NAIROBI

CAIRO JIDDA SANA TEHRAN PARIS MOSCOW FROM SECSTATE

DTD 13 FEB 1976 QUOTE

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EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADOR FROM INR-SAUNDERS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR, FT

SUBJECT: INR PAPER ON FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS

(FTAI)

REF: ADDIS ABABA 1679 (NOTAL)

1. FOLLOWING TEXT OF RECENT INR MEMORANDUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE FTAI AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO INTERESTED POSTS FOR THEIR COMMENTS. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR FURTHER ANALYSES AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY:

(A)--THE FRENCH DECISION TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE SECRET

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NEXT 18 MONTHS TO 2 YEARS HAS TRIGGERED REFLEX ACTIONS IN BOTH SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA--IRREDENTISM IN THE FORMER, FEARS OF LOSING A VITAL COMMUNICATIONS LINK IN THE LATTER.

(B)--THE FRENCH WILL SEEK INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR THE FTAI AND PLAN TO STATION FORCES THERE AFTER INDEPENDENCE. BUT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO KEEP TROOPS THERE IF THEY HAVE TO COMBAT A SUSTAINED INSURGENCY--WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE SOMALIA'S FIRST TACTICAL CHOICE.

(C)--IF FRENCH TROOPS LEAVE, THE SOMALIS PRESUMABLY WOULD ESCALATE INSURGENCY AND PERHAPS TRY A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ATTACK. THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD PROBABLY REACT TO THE LATTER WITH MILITARY FORCE AND MIGHT EVEN BE TEMPTED TO TRY A PREVENTIVE STRIKE.

(D)--THE SIDE THAT FIRST LAUNCHED THE ATTACK WOULD HAVE THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE. IF THE ETHIOPIANS CAPTURED DJIBOUTI, IT WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOMALIS TO DISLODGE THEM. IF THE SOMALIS SEIZED DJIBOUTI, A DETERMINED ETHIOPIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE COULD EVENTUALLY OUST THEM, BUT TO DO THIS THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD HAVE TO TRANSFER SOME UNITS NOW FIGHTING INSURGENCIES IN ETHIOPIA PROPER.

(E)--THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT WANT WAR AT THIS TIME IN THE HORN AND WOULD DISCOURAGE SIAD FROM LAUNCHING OPEN HOSTILITIES. IT WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, DETER THE SOMALIS FROM INSURGENCY AND SUBVERSION.

(F)--IF WAR DID BREAK OUT, THE SOVIETS WOULD BACK THE SOMALIS WHILE SEEKING A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FTAI--A CASUS BELLI IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:

4. FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO THE FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS (FTAI) (WHICH CONSISTS OF THE PORT OF DJIBOUTI AND ITS BARREN HINTERLAND), PROBABLY WITHIN THE NEXT 18 MONTHS TO 2 YEARS. THIS RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT RIVAL ETHIOPIAN AND SOMALI INTERESTS IN
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THE TERRITORY'S FUTURE WILL LEAD TO ARMED CONFLICT.

5. FRANCE HOPES TO RETAIN BASE RIGHTS IN DJIBOUTI FOR AT LEAST A FEW YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND, IN RETURN, WILL KEEP FRENCH TROOPS THERE TO GUARANTEE THE NEW STATE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. BUT THE FRENCH HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WILL NOT BE THE SOLE GUARANTOR SINCE THEY ALONE CANNOT MAINTAIN THE PRECARIOUS POLITICAL BALANCE IN THE REGION. THEY STILL HOPE TO DEVISE A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, ESPECIALLY FROM THE OAU AND THE ARAB LEAGUE, BUT ONLY THE FRENCH GUARANTEE WOULD HAVE ANY TEETH IN IT.

6. SOMALIA STILL CLINGS TO ITS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF INCORPORATING THE FTAI (THE ISSAS ARE A SOMALI SUBCLAN), BUT IT OFFICIALLY SUPPORTS INDEPENDENCE FOR THE TERRITORY. SOMALIA MAY BE WILLING TO COEXIST FOR A FEW YEARS WITH AN

INDEPENDENT FTAI IN WHICH ISSAS WOULD PLAY A MAJOR POLITICAL ROLE. THE MOGADISCIO GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO USE SUBVERSION TO PURSUE ITS IRREDENTIST GOALS, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD RESORT TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE IF IT ANTICIPATED AN EASY VICTORY.

7. ETHIOPIA'S MAJOR CONCERN IS TO PREVENT CONTROL OF DJIBOUTI--THE TERMINUS OF THE ONLY RAILROAD FROM ADDIS ABABA TO THE SEA--BY SOMALIA OR A PRO-SOMALI STATE. THE HARASSED ETHIOPIAN MILITARY REGIME WOULD PREFER THAT THE FRENCH REMAIN FOR THE TIME BEING, BUT HAS CONCLUDED THAT AN INDEPENDENT FTAI, WITH CLOSE ECONOMIC LINKS TO ETHIOPIA, IS THE BEST IT CAN HOPE FOR. ADDIS ABABA AND PARIS ARE COOPERATING TO ENSURE THE TERRITORY'S ACCESSION TO INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ALI AREF, THE PRO-FRENCH AFAR HEAD OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHO IS DISPOSED TO WORK WITH ETHIOPIA (THE AFARS LIVE IN BOTH THE FTAI AND ETHIOPIA). BUT IF ETHIOPIA BELIEVED THAT THE SOMALIS WERE ABOUT TO TAKE OVER THE TERRITORY BY FORCE OR SUBVERSION, IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TRY TO SEIZE IT BY MILITARY ACTION.

8. THE SOMALI STRATEGY:

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9. SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD IS BASICALLY CAUTIOUS. HE IS ALSO DETERMINED TO THWART WHAT HE ACCURATELY PERCEIVES AS A FRENCH-ETHIOPIAN DESIGN TO ENSURE THAT AN INDEPENDENT FTAI WOULD BE HOSTILE TO SOMALI TERRITORIAL PRETENSIONS. SIAD'S TACTICS ARE THREEFOLD: FIRST, POLITICAL PRESSURE, THEN SUBVERSION, AND AS A LAST RESORT, ARMED CONFLICT.

10. POLITICAL PRESSURE: SIAD WILL TRY TO RALLY THIRD WORLD SENTIMENT AGAINST CREATION OF A FRENCH/ETHIOPIAN "PUPPET REGIME" AND IN FAVOR OF A MORE NEUTRAL OR PRO-SOMALI GOVERNMENT AND EVENTUAL INCORPORATION OF THE TERRITORY INTO SOMALIA. HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE MIXED SUCCESS. THE OAU WISHES TO AVOID A CONFLICT THAT COULD DIVIDE ITS RANKS AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO WORK FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOTH ETHNIC COMMUNITIES. ARAB COUNTRIES GENERALLY SUPPORT AN INDEPENDENT FTAI AS A PROSPECTIVE MUSLIM STATE THAT WOULD HELP TRANSFORM THE RED SEA INTO AN "ARAB LAKE." ONLY LIBYA, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND PERHAPS ALGERIA MIGHT BACK SOMALI TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND OTHER RED SEA LITTORAL STATES FEAR THAT AN INCREASE IN SOVIET AND RADICAL ARAB INFLUENCE WOULD ACCOMPANY A SOMALI ANNEXATION

OF THE TERRITORY.

11. AT THE SAME TIME, SIAD IS OFFERING PARIS AND ADDIS ABABA INDUCEMENTS TO COMPROMISE, SUCH AS A SOMALI GUARANTEE OF FTAI INDEPENDENCE AND SOMALI ACQUIESCENCE IN CONTINUED FRENCH ECONOMIC TIES AND EVEN IN FRENCH NAVAL ACCESS TO DJIBOUTI. SIAD ALSO SAYS HE WOULD GUARANTEE ETHIOPIAN ACCESS TO THE RAILROAD AND PORT. BUT IN RETURN, HE IS DEMANDING A NEW FTAI GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD REPRESENT THE "WILL OF THE MAJORITY," I.E., ISSAS. HE IS ALSO CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TROOPS. THUS, THE ONLY PROTECTION FOR THE INTERESTS OF ADDIS ABABA AND PARIS WOULD BE THE WORD OF A MAN THEY PROFOUNDLY DISTRUST.

12. SUBVERSION: IF PARIS FAILS TO RESPOND TO SOMALI OVERTURES, SIAD WILL STEP UP PRESSURE ON THE FRENCH THROUGH A CAMPAIGN OF SUBVERSION AND VIOLENCE. HE IS PLANNING TO INFILTRATE ISSAS INTO THE TERRITORY TO OUTVOTE
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THE AFARS IN ANY ELECTION HELD AS PART OF THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS. MOREOVER, ISSA "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" ARE BEING TRAINED IN NORTHERN SOMALIA--BY CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCORDING TO SEVERAL RECENT REPORTS. SIAD HAS TOLD US THAT HE WOULD UNLEASH THESE GUERRILLAS IF THE FRENCH REMAINED OBDURATE.

13. IN PAST YEARS ETHIOPIA AND FRANCE HAVE COUNTERED SOMALI ATTEMPTS TO SWELL ISSA ROLLS AT ELECTION TIME BY BRINGING IN LARGE NUMBERS OF ETHIOPIAN AFARS. BUT THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY REGIME'S DEPOSAL OF THE AFAR SULTAN HAS DESTROYED THE OLD FEUDAL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ETHIOPIAN AFARS AND HAS DRIVEN THEM INTO OPEN REBELLION. MOST FTAI AFARS SYMPATHIZE STRONGLY WITH THEIR KINSMEN IN ETHIOPIA AND REJECT ALI AREF'S POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ADDIS ABABA REGIME UNTIL IT REINSTATES THE SULTAN. AN ETHIOPIAN COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF THE SULTAN WOULD STRENGTHEN ADDIS ABABA'S ABILITY TO RESIST SOMALI SUBVERSION AND WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF A "MUSLIM" ALLIANCE OF FTAI AFARS AND ISSAS VERSUS "CHRISTIAN" ETHIOPIA.

14. THE 6,000 FRENCH TROOPS NOW GARRISONED IN THE TERRITORY COULD HALT AND EVENTUALLY REPEL A SOMALI INVASION, BUT THEY WOULD BE LESS EFFECTIVE IN CONTAINING SOMALI-SUPPORTED INSURGENT OPERATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE DEFINITE LIMITS TO FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT TROOP REINFORCEMENTS IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD. FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE AND ECONOMY, THE FRENCH WOULD LIKE TO RETAIN THE DJIBOUTI BASE, REGARDLESS OF THEIR CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH THEIR INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON AT SEA.

BUT INDICATIONS THAT THE FTAI WAS CAUSING SUBSTANTIAL FRENCH CASUALTIES OR WAS BADLY TARNISHING FRANCE'S THIRD WORLD IMAGE WOULD CAUSE PARIS TO REASSESS ITS MILITARY NEEDS.

15. ARMED CONFLICT: A CONTINUING SOMALI SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN COULD THUS LEAD THE FRENCH TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, AND TO A MOGADISCIO ATTEMPT TO INSTALL A PRO-SOMALI REGIME. WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD RESULT IN AN
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ETHIOPIAN MOVE TO SEIZE CERTAIN STRATEGIC AREAS, ESPECIALLY THE RAILROAD LINE AND DJIBOUTI ITSELF.

16. THE SIDE THAT MOVED FIRST IN ANY OPEN CONFLICT WOULD HAVE THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE:

(A)--IF THE ETHIOPIANS CAPTURED DJIBOUTI BY A COUP DE MAIN, IT WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOMALIA TO DISLODGE THEM.

(B)--IF THE SOMALIS SEIZED DJIBOUTI BY A COUP DE MAIN, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ETHIOPIANS TO DISLODGE THEM IMMEDIATELY. THE SOMALIS WOULD TRY TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR GAINS BY CALLING FOR A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE. BUT IF THE WAR SHOULD GO ON, THE SOMALIS WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY SUPPORTING THEIR FORCES IN THE FTAI, AND A DETERMINED ETHIOPIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE COULD EVENTUALLY OUST THEM.

(C)--BUT AN ETHIOPIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE WOULD REQUIRE THE TRANSFER OF SOME OF THE UNITS FIGHTING INSURGENCIES IN ETHIOPIA PROPER AND THE TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THESE REBELLIOUS AREAS.

(D)--IF SIZABLE NUMBERS OF CUBAN TROOPS WERE INTRODUCED ON THE SOMALI SIDE--PURELY A SPECULATION AT THIS POINT--IT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE CHANCES THAT THE SOMALIS COULD BE DISLODGED.

17. A POSSIBLE POLITICAL COMPROMISE?

18. THE FRENCH ARE HOPING TO TRANSFER POWER TO ALI AREF, THEIR FAITHFUL AFAR COLLABORATOR FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS. BUT THE ISSAS DETEST HIM FOR HIS TRIBALISM, CORRUPTION, AND POLITICAL REPRESSION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ANOTHER FRENCH CANDIDATE--EITHER AFAR OR ISSA--COULD PUT TOGETHER A POLITICAL COALITION THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION AND THAT WOULD OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE UNDER FRENCH AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

19. DESPITE ETHNIC AFFINITIES WITH ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA, THE FTAI POPULATION MAY SEE ITS INTERESTS BEST SERVED BY

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AN INDEPENDENT STATE THAT COULD LOOK FORWARD TO ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM FRANCE AND FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES FROM WEALTHY MUSLIM NEIGHBORS (ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA). THE RELATIVELY BOURGEOIS ISSAS HAVE LITTLE USE FOR THE MILITANTLY SOCIALIST MOGADISCIO REGIME, AND THE CONSERVATIVE AFARS IN THE FTAI, LIKE THEIR KINSMEN IN ETHIOPIA, HAVE LITTLE AFFINITY WITH THE RADICAL ADDIS ABABA REGIME.

20. THE MOGADISCIO GOVERNMENT HAS A FOLLOWING IN THE FTAI, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE RADICAL ISSA YOUTH. BUT THE LEADERS OF THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY ARE AFAR AND ISSA FRANCOPHILES WHO ESSENTIALLY WANT A GREATER SHARING OF POLITICAL POWER BEYOND ALI AREF'S OWN CIRCLE. SOMALIA WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT FTAI THAT HAD NO SPECIAL TIES WITH MOGADISCIO. BUT IF AFRICAN AND ARAB SUPPORT CAN BE OBTAINED FOR AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT OF "NATIONALISTS" RATHER THAN "NEOCOLONIALISTS," SIAD MIGHT BE FORCED TO GO ALONG.

21. THE SOVIETS:

22. THE SOVIETS HAVE A CLOSE AND MUTUALLY SATISFYING RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR SOMALI CLIENTS. IN RETURN FOR ACCESS TO MILITARY FACILITIES, THE SOVIETS HAVE EXTENDED \$185 MILLION IN MILITARY AID (INCLUDING STYX MISSILES, OSA-2 PATROL BOATS, SA-2'S, AND MIG-21'S) AND HAVE IMPROVED SOMALI MILITARY FACILITIES. ECONOMIC AID NOW TOTALS \$160 MILLION. SOME 2,000-2,500 SOVIET ADVISERS PERMEATE THE SOMALI MILITARY AND THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY.

23. CAUTION: THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR BEEN CIRCUMSPECT ON THE FTAI QUESTION. BUT AS FTAI INDEPENDENCE NEARS AND ANTAGONISMS SHARPEN, MOSCOW WILL HAVE TO RETHINK ITS APPROACH, AS IT TRIES TO RECONCILE SUPPORT FOR THE SOMALIS WITH OTHER SOVIET INTERESTS WHICH MAY BE THREATENED BY SIAD'S ADVENTURISM.

(A)--UP TO NOW THE SOVIETS HAVE DEMONSTRATED NO APPARENT INTEREST IN THE FTAI PER SE. THEY HAVE NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORTED FTAI LIBERATION GROUPS, AND WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS OF ANY SOVIET CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY. THERE IS NO SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR PRESENCE IN DJIBOUTI.

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(B)--DESPITE THEIR CLOSE TIES WITH MOGADISCIO, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET ENDORSED SOMALI CLAIMS TO THE FTAI.

SOVIET CAUTION HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDABLE. MOSCOW HAS SEEN NO ADVANTAGE IN COMPLICATING ITS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BY MEDDLING IN THE FTAI. AND THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI RIVALRY OVER THE TERRITORY POSES HAZARDS FOR SOVIET LOCAL INTERESTS:

(A)--IF THE USSR SUPPORTS THE SOMALIS TOO ACTIVELY, IT REDUCES THE CHANCE TO BROADEN ITS EXPANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MORE IMPORTANT REGIONAL POWER, ETHIOPIA.

(B)--BUT IF IT FAILS TO SUPPORT SOMALI ASPIRATIONS, IT RISKS ITS IMPORTANT INVESTMENTS IN SOMALIA.

24. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MOSCOW APPARENTLY HAS VIEWED THE RISKS OF ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE FTAI AS FAR OUTWEIGHING THE ADVANTAGES.

25. PRIORITIES: IN THE FUTURE MOSCOW'S POLICY TOWARD THE FTAI WILL PROBABLY BE REACTIVE. IT WILL REFLECT BASIC SOVIET PRIORITIES IN THE HORN WHICH ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE UNLESS THE FRENCH ABANDON DJIBOUTI ALTOGETHER. AT PRESENT WE JUDGE THESE TO BE, IN ORDER OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE:

(A)--PROTECTION OF ITS STAKE IN SOMALIA;

(B)--AVOIDANCE OF COMPLICATIONS IN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE;

(C)--PRESERVATION OF ITS EXPANDING POTENTIAL FOR TIES WITH ETHIOPIA;

(D)--AN INCREASE IN ACCESS TO THE DJIBOUTI NAVAL FACILITIES.

MOSCOW MUST ALSO WEIGH, THOUGH WE THINK LESS SERIOUSLY:
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(A)--POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTIONS FROM OTHER REGIONAL POWERS (E.G., EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA) VERSUS THE ADVANTAGES OF STRENGTHENING THE AREA'S "PROGRESSIVES" THROUGH A SOMALI SUCCESS; AND

(B)--THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON DETENTE OF ANOTHER CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN-BACKED CLIENTS VERSUS SUPPORT FOR ANOTHER "LIBERATION STRUGGLE" WITH SOME POTENTIAL FOR A FAVORABLE OUTCOME. MOSCOW PROBABLY SEES NO SIGNIFICANT "AMERICAN INTEREST" AT STAKE IN THE FTAI.

26. HOSTILITIES: WE THINK THE SOVIETS HOPE TO DELAY OR TO AVOID OPEN HOSTILITIES BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA OR BETWEEN SOMALIA AND A FRENCH-RULED OR INDEPENDENT FTAI.

MOSCOW WILL TRY TO REINFORCE SIAD'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH BECAUSE IT SEES UNACCEPTABLE RISKS IN OVERT SOMALI MILITARY ADVENTURISM AT PRESENT.

(A)--THE FRENCH ABILITY TO REPEL ANY OVERT ATTACK ON THE FTAI BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, AND THE UNCERTAIN OUTCOME OF AN ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI WAR AFTER INDEPENDENCE, CREATE AN UNFAVORABLE MILITARY BALANCE. THIS COULD BE CHANGED ONLY BY SIGNIFICANT SOVIET OR CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

(B)--IF THE SOMALIS FAILED TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST MINIMAL OBJECTIVES IN A WAR, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY BE BLAMED FOR THE FAILURE AND THEIR ACCESS TO THEIR MILITARY FACILITIES COULD BE JEOPARDIZED.

(C)--WORSE, IF ETHIOPIA WERE TO GAIN THE INITIATIVE AND CARRY THE WAR INTO SOMALIA, MOSCOW WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE BETWEEN RESCUING SIAD AND LOSING ITS FOOTHOLD IN THE HORN.

MOREOVER, A WAR CARRYING THE RISK OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR DAMAGE TO OTHER SOVIET INTERESTS, INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, DETENTE WITH THE US, AND VARIOUS MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICAN CONCERNS.

27. ALTERNATIVES TO HOSTILITIES: MOSCOW PROBABLY SEES
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INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED INDEPENDENCE FOR THE FTAI AS OFFERING THE BEST POSSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING WAR. THE SOVIETS ACCEPT THAT INDEPENDENCE WOULD PROBABLY MEAN CONTINUATION OF A PROMINENT FRENCH PRESENCE AND NO APPRECIABLE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE SHORT RUN. BUT THEY MAY WELL SEE THIS AS A WELCOME BRAKE ON SIAD'S ADVENTURISM. MOREOVER, EVEN A WEAK AND UNSTABLE INDEPENDENT FTAI IS PROBABLY VIEWED AS POSING FEWER HAZARDS THAN OPEN HOSTILITIES AND AS OFFERING MOSCOW MORE ROOM TO PURSUE ITS OBJECTIVES.

28. IN THE NEAR TERM MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO TRY TO INFLUENCE FRENCH HANDLING OF THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS TO PROTECT ITS SOMALI AND ETHIOPIAN INTERESTS. THE SOVIETS CAN THUS BACK SIAD'S POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TO PRESS PARIS FOR CONCESSIONS TO SOMALI INTERESTS AND PLACE THE ONUS FOR ANY HARM TO ETHIOPIAN INTERESTS ON FRANCE. RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS (E.G., TO OUR CHARGE IN MOGADISCIO) TO THE EFFECT THAT WAR WILL BE INEVITABLE

UNLESS FRANCE TAKES SOMALI CLAIMS INTO ACCOUNT PROBABLY REFLECT THIS POSTURE.

29. TO STRENGTHEN THIS APPROACH MOSCOW MAY EVEN ENDORSE,

OR AT A MINIMUM TAKE NO STEPS TO DISCOURAGE, SOMALI SUBVERSION IN THE TERRITORY, ON THE THEORY THAT SIAD MIGHT THEREBY GAIN MORE CONCESSIONS FROM THE FRENCH WITHOUT PROVOKING A WAR. HOWEVER, THE FEBRUARY 4 KIDNAPPING INCIDENT IN DJIBOUTI MAY GIVE THE SOVIETS PAUSE AS THEY CONSIDER ITS REPERCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.

30. IF SIAD'S DESIGNS ARE FRUSTRATED, AND INDEPENDENCE COMES IN A FORM UNACCEPTABLE TO MOGADISCIO, MOSCOW WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO SUPPORT A MORE AGGRESSIVE SOMALI POLICY. IN THAT CASE THE QUESTION WILL BE WHETHER MOSCOW, AS SOMALIA'S MAJOR ARMS AND OIL SUPPLIER, WILL OR CAN USE ITS LEVERAGE TO CURTAIL SIAD'S ACTION.

31. MOSCOW WILL, IN TYPICAL SOVIET FASHION, BE MOST RELUCTANT TO USE ITS LEVERAGE IN ANY MANNER WHICH MIGHT THREATEN ITS SOMALI FOOTHOLD. EVEN IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER,
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WE THINK THE SOVIETS' PREFERRED TACTICS WOULD STILL BE TO PREVENT SOMALI ACTIONS THAT WOULD SERVE AS A CASUS BELLI. THE MOST LIKELY SOVIET APPROACH WOULD BE TO TRY TO CONFINESOMALI ACTIVITIES TO SUBVERSION AND CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY IN THE HOPE THAT THE FTAI BALANCE OVER TIME COULD BE ALTERED IN SOMALIA'S FAVOR WITHOUT A WAR.

32. IN THE EVENT OF A GENERALIZED CONFLICT, MOSCOW WOULD PROBABLY SEEK TO PROTECT ITS FOOTHOLD IN SOMALIA BY REMAINING THE SOMALIS' MILITARY SUPPLIER. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LIMIT THE CONFLICT BY LOOKING FOR A RESOLUTION THAT WOULD MEET MINIMAL SOMALI AND ETHIOPIAN REQUIREMENTS.

33. CUBAN INVOLVEMENT:

34. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN COMBAT UNITS INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE FTAI SEEMS UNLIKELY FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:

(A)--THE CURRENT HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN ANGOLA AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY IMMINENT PROSPECT OF REDUCING SIGNIFICANTLY THE CUBAN COMMITMENT THERE;

(B)--THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORTING A SIZABLE COMBAT FORCE IN SOMALIA, WHICH WOULD BE VASTLY MORE COMPLICATED THAN IN ANGOLA;

(C)--UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE OUTCOME, GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD THAT WELL-EQUIPPED ETHIOPIAN FORCES WOULD BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT;

(D)--A RELUCTANCE TO CONFRONT THE FRENCH, WITH WHOM CUBA

HAS REASONABLY GOOD RELATIONS AND FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC TIES;

(E)--THE ABSENCE OF A WELL-ARTICULATED INDIGENOUS LIBERATION MOVEMENT THAT WOULD SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS, OR OF ANY CLEARLY DEFINED IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR CUBAN INTERVENTION.

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35. SOVIET POLICY ON THIS ISSUE WOULD CERTAINLY BE A MAJOR ELEMENT IN CUBAN DECISIONMAKING. CASTRO WOULD NOT COMMIT CUBAN TROOPS IN THE FACE OF SOVIET OPPOSITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT OR EVEN INDIFFERENCE WOULD GIVE THE CUBANS A RELATIVELY WIDE LATITUDE.

36. FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, CUBAN SUPPORT FOR SOMALI-SPONSORED INSURGENCY WILL PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO PROVIDING TRAINING AND ADVISERS. RECENT REPORTS THAT 1,500 TO 2,000 CUBANS ARE TRAINING GUERRILLA GROUPS SEEM GREATLY EXAGGERATED; A TOTAL OF 100-250 IS PROBABLY A MORE REASONABLE ESTIMATE. KISSINGER UNQTE INGERSOLL

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